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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ANDREW OWENS MALLERY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
: Case No. 20010555-CA 
: Priority No. 2 (incarcerated) 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this case 
involving a conviction of first degree felony entered in a court of record and transferred 
to this Court by the Utah Supreme Court. 
ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
1. Did the trial court err in denying Mallery's motion to suppress based on the 
police violation of Mallery's rights against unreasonable search and seizure? 
This Court reviews the trial court's findings of fact for clear error and conclusions 
of law for correctness. See, e^ , State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, f7, 17 P.3d 1135. 
This issue was preserved by pretrial motion (R. 59-63), which was ruled on by the 
trial court (R. 159-164). 
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2. Did the trial court err in denying Mallery's motion to suppress eyewitness 
identification? 
Whether the trial court applied the correct legal analysis to the eyewitness 
identification issue presents a legal question to be reviewed without deference, for 
correctness. See State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 942-43 (Ut. App. 1997). 
In reviewing the reliability of the eyewitness identification, the Court grants trial 
courts a measure of discretion. See State v. Perry. 899 P.2d 1232, 1235-36 (Utah App. 
1995). The court reviews the record to determine from the totality of circumstances 
whether the identification was consistent with Article I §7 of the Utah Constitution. State 
v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991). Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, 
but the ultimate legal conclusion of reliability is one of law, to be reviewed for 
correctness. See id. 
This issue was preserved by pretrial motion (R. 56-57), which was denied by the 
trial court (R. 159-164). 
STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statute and constitutional provisions pertain: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; 
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and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person 
or thing to be seized. 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV § 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of itizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its juridiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
The State charged Mallery and co-defendant Jesus Isreal Rosillo by information 
with one count of aggravated robbery (R. 5-6). 
Through counsel, Mallery moved the court to suppress eyewitness identification 
(R. 56-57). 
Mallery moved to suppress evidence found as a result of the search of Mallery and 
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his home (R. 59-63). 
Judge Hanson denied the motions to suppress in a minute entry directing the 
prosecution to draft detailed findings and conclusions (R. 159-164). 
No findings or conclusions were submitted or entered. 
Following a trial, the jury convicted Mallery as charged, and indicated on their 
verdict that he used a firearm in the commission of the aggravated robbery (R. 216). 
Judge Hanson sentenced Mallery to a term of six years to life at the Utah State 
Prison (R. 254-55). 
Counsel filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 262). 
The Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this Court (R. 268). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
On August 18, 2000, at about 2:00 a.m., Steven Lund stopped at the Ute Car Wash 
on 300 South and 300 East, to clean out the van he was driving for the Embassy Hotel (R. 
273 at 141). Two people approached, and one Lund later identified as Mallery was 
holding a black handgun, at about waist level and pointing it at Lund, and then the other 
robber, whom Lund later identified as Rosillo, demanded money (R. 273 at 147-48, 150). 
When Lund pulled out a bundle of cash, Rosillo demanded more money, and Lund then 
1
 Counsel for Mallery first states the facts as they were established at trial, to 
give this Court an understanding of how he was prejudiced by the trial court's denial of 
his motions to suppress. 
In the argument portion of the brief, he will then summarize the facts established 
at the evidentiary hearing on the motions to suppress. While this second summary is 
redundant to the evidence at trial in many respects, counsel for Mallery sets it forth 
separately, because this was the evidence available to the trial court at the time of his 
ruling denying the motions to suppress. 
4 
gave him his wallet containing cash, credit card, and Lund's driver's license and library 
card (R. 273 at 147-48). He gave them $330 (R. 273 at 150). 
There was a light directly overhead, and the robbers were about five feet from 
Lund (R. 273 at 151). The event was surprising, stressful and frightening (R. 273 at 171). 
Lund saw them walking away as he continued vacuuming, and the last time he saw 
them, they were walking off the carwash property (R. 273 at 148, 172, 182). About 
fifteen seconds later, Lund got in the van and called the hotel operator on his two-way 
radio, and asked her to call the police (R. 273 at 149-150). 
He described the robbers as being two Hispanic males with black hair and dark 
skin (R. 273 at 173-74). They were in their late teens or early twenties and thin (R. 273 at 
174). He said the person with a gun had a dark baseball cap and the other person had a 
blue sweatshirt (R. 273 at 174). He said they were about five feet ten inches tall (R. 273 
at 152). He did not mention any facial hair or distinctive logos on their clothing, or 
describe their pants or shoes (R. 273 at 174-175). 
The police were stopping all suspects in the area, including at least two who were 
not charged (R. 273 at 195). 
Angie Renteria, Salt Lake City Police dispatcher, was present in the Salt Lake City 
Public Safety Building located at 315 East 200 South, on the fifth floor in the northeast 
corner of the building (R. 273 at 184-185). She overheard Lund's robber/ over the 
dispatch radio, and expected the robbers, who had been walking northbound from the 
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carwash, to come by her office (R. 273 at 186). She watched out her window and saw 
two males in dark clothing, one of whom was wearing a baseball cap, walk out of an 
apartment building apparently located at 228 South 300 East and get into a Ute Cab 
(R.273 at 187, 214). A dispatch operator called the cab's dispatcher and asked where the 
two men were heading, and Renteria saw the cab heading northbound on 3rd East (R. 273 
at 188). 
The dispatch operator broadcast a report that two suspects matching the robbers' 
descriptions were in a cab, and gave the location and intended destination of the cab (R. 
273 at 188). 
Jeffrey Carter of the Salt Lake City Police Department had a description of the 
gunman as a male Hispanic, twenty years old, five feet ten inches tall, thin, with a dark 
baseball cap (R. 273 at 213). He momentarily detained two people on second east and 
second south, but released them after determining that they were probably not involved 
(R. 273 at 196-199). He then heard a dispatch report that a Ute Cab number 42 had 
picked up two males from an apartment building between the car wash and police station, 
and was headed toward 700 North and Redwood Road (R. 273 at 199-201). Carter 
found the cab on North Temple and State Street and called for backup (R. 273 at 200-
201). 
The police stopped the cab after it turned west to go west on North Temple (R. 
273 at 202). With at least four police units present, Officers Carter and Hamideh 
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approached the cab and had the occupants in the backseat exit the cab (R. 273 at 203). 
Carter patted down Jesus Rosillo, searched him and found $171 in cash (R. 273 at 203-
204). One of the suspects was wearing a baseball cap, police found another cap in the cab 
(R. 273 at 212). One cap was red and one was blue (R. 273 at 212). 
Officer Hamideh testified that when they stopped the cab, they ordered the 
passengers to put their hands out the window because of the gun used in the robbery 
(R.274 at 234). The suspects complied with this command, and Hamideh informed 
Mallery that he considered him armed and dangerous (R. 274 at 234). Hamideh had 
Mallery lace his fingers behind his head, and grabbed Mallery and held him as he frisked 
him for weapons (R. 274 at 235). Hamideh did not feel a weapon, but did feel a 
rectangular object in a pocket (R. 274 at 235). 
Hamideh took Mallery to the back of Hamideh's patrol car and asked his name, 
which he provided accurately (R. 274 at 236). Hamideh asked if he had photo 
identification, and when Mallery said he did not, Hamideh asked what was in his right 
rear pocket (R. 274 at 236). Mallery said it was his wallet, and Hamideh asked if he 
minded if Hamideh pulled it out (R. 274 at 236). Mallery replied, "No," and Hamideh 
asked, "No, I can't pull that out?" Mallery replied, "Go ahead, take it." (R. 274 at 236). 
The rectangle was a bundle containing $169 in cash and Mr. Lund's driver's license, 
credit card and other cards and papers (R. 274 at 237-243). 
Hamideh described Mallery as having facial hair and a tan at the time of the arrest, 
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and said he looked Hispanic (R. 274 at 244-45). Mallery's shirt and cap both had some 
type of logos on them, which were not mentioned in the suspect description (R. 274 at 
251). 
Officer Zane Swim spoke with a male and female in front of the apartments where 
the suspects caught the cab, and then Swim went in to investigate (R. 274 at 264). He 
initially received word from dispatch that the suspects had gone into and left apartment 
20, but after awakening the resident of that apartment and then receiving an additional 
dispatch, the officers went to apartment 22 shortly before 3:00 a.m. (R. 274 at 265-266). 
The police obtained permission from Yolanda Vetone Nava to search the apartment for 
evidence of a crime her husband, Jesus, may have been involved in (R. 274 at 266). In a 
closet containing a water heater, he found a gun and Mr. Lund's wallet (R. 274 at 267). 
There was no evidence presented tying Lund to the apartment, and there was no 
fingerprint evidence presented. 
After Lund returned to the hotel, perhaps fifteen minutes after the robbery, he 
overheard the police dispatch indicating that they had arrested two suspects, had searched 
two suspects, and had found Lund's property in the course of their searches of the 
suspects (R. 273 at 175-176). 
The police made no effort to conduct a photospread or lineup (R. 273 at 219). 
Officer Hawk took Lund in his police car to North Temple and West Temple, 
where there were two men in custody and surrounded by at least half a dozen police 
8 
officers, and several police cars with red flashing lights (R. 273 at 159-160, 177). The 
police had blocked traffic out of the vicinity (R. 273 at 216). Officer Hawk shone his 
spotlight on the two handcuffed suspects from about forty feet away, and Lund 
immediately identified them as the suspects (R. 273 at 161, 177). He said that Mallery, 
who was wearing a blue pullover shirt and a backwards red baseball cap, was the gunman 
(R. 273 at 162). 
Lund saw Mallery again in a patrol car with some police officers, and later 
identified Mallery at a lineup on October 12, 2000, and also saw him at other hearings (R. 
273 at 163, 178). 
Mallery is Caucasian (R. 273 at 179, 213). 
Lund said that the gun found in proximity to his wallet looked similar to the one 
used in the robbery (R. 273 at 152, 159). He also identified various items kept in his 
wallet and recovered by the police from Mallery (R. 273 at 154-155). 
Summary of Argument 
The trial court erred in denying the motions to suppress. 
The police were not legally justified in stopping the cab and immediately treating 
the occupants as though they were under arrest, absent probable cause. The information 
available to the police did not give rise to reasonable suspicion, let alone probable cause. 
The officer was not justified in demanding to know the contents of Mallery's 
wallet, and this conduct amounted to a search. 
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Any consent given was tainted by the preceding illegalities. 
Lund's identification of Mallery was the product of suggestion. While there are 
multiple cases affirming identifications stemming from show-ups, none involved the level 
of suggestiveness involved here, where the alleged victim was informed prior to the 
show-up that the police not only had two suspects under arrest, but also had found on the 
suspects his property taken during the robbeiy. 
Argument 
I. 
FACTS ESTABLISHED AT EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
AND RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT 
A. HEARING FACTS 
1. THE ROBBERY 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Steven Lund testified that as he was 
vacuuming the Embassy Suites Hotel van at the Ute Carwash on 3rd East and 3rd South at 
about 2 a.m. on August 18, 2000 (R. 272 at 65-66). He noticed two males behind him 
standing about five feet away from him. One was holding a gun, wearing a red baseball 
cap and a blue sweatshirt, and the other was wearing a tan shirt. They were both wearing 
jeans (R. 272 at 66). One held the gun on him, while the other demanded money. After 
he gave them money, the one without the gun demanded more, and he gave him his wallet 
(R. 272 at 67). 
The suspects headed north on foot (R. 272 at 68). 
The robbery lasted ten to fifteen seconds and the lighting was good (R. 272 at 67). 
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He got a good look at their faces and focused on them (R. 272 at 68). They headed north 
on foot (R. 272 at 68). He had been awake since about noon the day before., and 
normally works a shift from 5 p.m. to 2 a.m. (R. 272 at 68). 
Lund turned around for a moment, and then drove off in the van and used the two-
way radio to call the hotel and ask them to call the police (R. 272 at 69). Officer Hawk, 
who was working for Embassy Suites, was present when he anived at the hotel (R. 272 at 
69). 
Lund talked to dispatch on the phone, and provided a description five to ten 
minutes after the robbery (R. 272 at 70). 
He first claimed that he provided a more thorough and accurate description to 
dispatch, but after hearing the dispatch tape, conceded that he did not say that the 
baseball cap was red, or that they were wearing jeans or a tan shirt (R. 272 at 79). He told 
the dispatcher that the robbers were Hispanic, but acknowledged that Mallery is 
Caucasian (R. 272 at 81). 
2. THE TRAFFIC STOP, ARRESTS. AND SEARCHES 
Dispatch operator Angie Renteria testified that from her office at 315 East 200 
South, kitty corner and down a bit southwest, she saw two males coming out of an 
apartment building and get into a Ute Cab, so she had an operator call the cab and get a 
description of the passengers, the cab number, and their intended destination (R. 272 at 5-
6, 12). The dispatch operator apparently confirmed that the cab contained two hispanics 
(R. 272 at 15). A dispatcher subsequently broadcast the cab number and its intended 
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destination (R. 272 at 8). 
The suspect information from Lund was that there were two male Hispanic 
suspects in their late teens or early twenties, one wearing a dark ball cap and one wearing 
a blue shirt (R. 272 at 6, 10). The crime occurred at 300 East and 300 South, and the 
suspects were supposedly heading northbound (R. 272 at 7). 
The police were stopping everyone in the neighborhood, and detained at least one 
other couple of suspects (R. 272 at 12). 
Jeffrey Carter testified that the description was two male Hispanics, one with a 
blue sweatshirt, one with a baseball cap, one of whom had used a gun (R. 272 at 18). He 
stopped two other males on 200 South and 200 East (R. 272 at 18). Carter located the 
cab number 42, in accordance with the dispatch, and he stopped it with Officer 
Hamideh's help (R. 272 at 18-20). Hamideh was in a separate car (R. 272 at 33). 
They directed the passengers to stick their hands out the window and Hamideh 
informed them that they were considered armed and dangerous (R. 272 at 20). Carter had 
his gun out during the arrest (R. 272 at 34). 
Carter frisked Rosillo and found no weapons, but cuffed him (R. 272 at 35). Other 
officers found Mr. Lund's identification on Mallery (R. 272 at 36). Mallery was also 
cuffed (R. 272 at 37). 
There were about five police cars, and at least that many officers surrounding the 
suspects during the showup (R. 272 at 38). 
Carter could not recall if Mallery and Rosillo were moved out for a clearer 
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viewing when Lund arrived (R. 272 at 39). 
Carter thought Mallery looked Caucasian, not Hispanic (R. 272 at 25). 
Carter was dispatched at 2:08, stopped the first two pedestrians at 2:10, got 
information about the Ute cab at about 2:21 or four or five minutes earlier (R. 272 at 28). 
He had information that there were two Hispanic males, and that the gunman was about 
five foot ten inches and about 20 years old and wearing a dark baseball cap (R. 272 at 
29). The other suspect was wearing a blue sweatshirt (R. 272 at 29). There was no other 
information about the clothing of the gunman (R. 272 at 32). 
During the show-up, Mallery and Rosillo were cuffed, separated, and standing 
outside cars, and the car that brought the victim came within fifty or a hundred feet (R. 
272 at 22-23). 
Hamideh was waiting in the police parking lot, thinking the suspects might come 
running north on 300 East (R. 272 at 43). He heard about the cab, and he went and 
stopped the car with Carter, and his police car lights were on during the stop (R. 272 at 
43, 49). They had the suspects roll down their windows and stick their hands out (R. 272 
at 43). He instructed Mallery to lace his fingers behind his head as he exited the car, and 
Hamideh did a weapon s frisk (R. 272 at 44). 
Hamideh found no weapons and told Mallery that he matched the description of a 
robbery suspect and cuffed him for his own safety (R. 272 at 44-45). In conducting the 
frisk, he felt something rectangular like an identification card or a wallet (R. 272 at 45). 
Hamideh walked Mallery to the back of Hamideh5 s car and asked him what his name 
13 
was, and when Mallery identified himself accurately, Hamideh asked for photo 
identification (R. 272 at 45-46). Hamideh asked him what was in his rear right pants 
pocket and Mallery said it was his wallet (R. 272 at 46). Hamideh asked him if he 
minded if he took it out, and Mallery said no (R. 272 at 46). Hamideh asked, "No, I can't 
take it out?" and Mallery answered "Oh, okay, take it out." (R. 272 at 46). Hamideh 
pulled it out and it was a stack of cards and cash and Steven Lund's driver's license (R. 
272 at 46). Hamideh could tell that Mallery was not the person depicted on the license, 
so he asked dispatch the name of the victim, and learned that it was Lund (R. 272 at 46-
47). 
At that point, Mallery interjected, "I found the wallet." (R. 272 at 47). Other 
officers took custody of Mallery (R. 272 at 47-48). 
He cuffed Mallery before asking him what was in his pocket (R. 272 at 45) 
Hamideh believed Mallery was Caucasian (R. 272 at 52). Rosillo was Hispanic 
(R. 272 at 53). 
Officer Zane Swim went to the apartment at 228 South and 300 East and found 
two people embracing in front (R. 272 at 56, 61). They said two people had gone into 
the apartments, but Swim made no record of their description of these people (R. 272 at 
60). He went inside to apartment 20 and found that the occupant was not involved in the 
robbery (R. 272 at 56). They then learned from the Ute Cab caller ID that the apartment 
in issue was 22 (R. 272 at 57). 
The police spoke with Yolanda Vitale-Nofa in Spanish, confirmed that her 
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husband had been in the apartment and then left, and obtained her consent to search for 
evidence that he had been involved in a robbery (R. 272 at 58). He opened a sliding door 
to the water heater and furnace and found a gun and wallet sitting behind the water heater 
(R. 272 at 59). 
The white woman who answered the door referred to Rosillo's wife as the person 
living in the apartment, and Swim made no effort to see who was on the lease or to ask 
who was living in the apartment (R. 272 at 63). 
The two people on the lawn in front of the apartments said that two people ran into 
the building and ran out shortly thereafter (R. 272 at 64). 
3. THE SHOWUP 
About fifteen minutes after the robbery, Lund was taken to about 50 West North 
Temple (R. 272 at 70). There were two men in custody, surrounded by four or five 
police officers and their cars (R. 272 at 70). The men were cuffed, standing some ten feet 
apart from one another, and surrounded by police, some thirty or forty feet from Lund (R. 
272 at 71, 72). As they pulled up and Hawk turned on his spotlight, Lund told Hawk, 
"That's them." (R. 272 at 71-72). He could distinguish then between the gunman and the 
other man, and identified Mallery as the gunman (R. 272 at 72-73). 
Before going to the showup, he had been listening to Officer Hawk's radio, and 
knew that the police had arrested and searched the two suspects, and that they were found 
to be in possession of his identification and other property (R. 272 at 80). 
He also saw Mallery in the back of a police car later, when he was going to 
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retrieve some of his property, which the police had recovered (R. 272 at 73). 
He also identified Mallery in a lineup in the jail (R. 272 at 74). 
He was certain of the identification (R. 272 at 74). 
B. TRIAL COURT RULING 
The trial court's minute entry provides, in relevant part, 
The Court determined that the search of the residence at 228 South 
300 East was with permission of the occupant, and that there was no 
constitutional infirmity with regard to that search. During that search, the 
victim's wallet and a firearm that matched the description of the firearm 
used in the armed robbery were located. The Court therefore denied the 
defendant's Motion to Suppress the evidence obtained during the search of 
the residence. 
The Court further determined that the search of the defendant's 
person, assuming the detention was otherwise appropriate, at the scene of 
the location where the police officers stopped the cab in which the 
defendant and co-defendant were riding, was with the defendant's consent. 
Further, the Court ruled that the initial stop of the cab in which the 
defendant and the co-defendant were riding was appropriate. The Court 
determined that the officers had at least an articulable suspicion regarding 
the occupants of the cab as being involved in the robbery which they were 
investigating. 
Finally, the Court ruled at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing 
that the initial show-up and identification of the defendant as one of the two 
that were involved in the robbery where Mr. Lund was the victim was 
proper. The Court determined that there was no inappropriate suggestion 
on the part of the police officers. The victim, Mr. Lund, not only made an 
immediate positive identification of the defendant and the co-defendant as 
being the persons who robbed him a few moments before at the Ute Car 
Wash on 300 East and 300 South, but has remained consistent in that 
identification through various court hearings and a line-up after the 
defendant's arrest. 
Accordingly, the defendant's Motion to Suppress the initial 
identification of him by the victim at the scene of the stop is denied. 
After considering the position of the parties, the Court is satisfied 
that the detention and the manner of detention, including the length of 
detention of the defendant after the initial stop, but after the defendant was 
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out of the cab, the police not only had a continued articulable suspicion, but 
had additional facts to constitute probable cause so as to believe that the 
defendant was involved in the robbery at the Ute Car Wash a few minutes 
before. 
The defendant Mallery was found wearing a baseball cap as was 
reported to the police officers. The defendant matched the build and height 
given as identification of the perpetrators of the robbery, and the defendant 
came from the immediate area of the robbery in the cab just a few minutes 
after the robbery occurred. The age of both the defendant and the 
codefendant Rosillo matched the description given by the victim, Mr. Lund. 
In addition to all the foregoing that created probable cause for the officers 
to believe that the defendant had been involved in a robbery a few minutes 
before at the Ute Car Wash, there was additional information after the 
defendant voluntarily agreed to have his person searched by the police 
officer, where identification and other documents relating to the victim, Mr. 
Lund, were located. Those documents found in the voluntary search of the 
defendant's person serve to increase the quantity of information available to 
the police officers to create additional probable cause regarding the 
defendant Mallery. 
The nature of the detention was reasonable to effect the purpose of 
the stop and, taking into account the nature of the crime being investigated, 
the manner of the detention was appropriate as well. The officers detained 
the defendant and co-suspect, Rosillo, near the location of the stop to see if 
they could be identified by the victim, and such a procedure is proper. The 
victim was close and the detention would be of short duration. The fact 
that the defendant was handcuffed while being detained by the police 
officers, while not usually called for, is appropriate under the circumstances 
where a crime being investigated was a crime involving the use of a 
firearm. 
Accordingly, the defendant's complaint that he was improperly 
detained after the initial stop in an unreasonable manner for an 
unreasonable length of time, so as to void the initial identification or void 
the voluntary search of the defendant's person, are without substance and as 
previously indicated, denied. 
(R. 159-163). 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE SUPPRESSED 
ALL EVIDENCE RESULTING FROM THE ILLEGAL 
ARREST AND SEARCH OF MALLERY. 
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The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized. 
"The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protect the 'right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.5" United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 362 (10th Cir. 1989). 
Article I §14 of the Utah Constitution provides protection at least as broad as the 
Fourth Amendment, and is at times construed to provide broader protection. See State v. 
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990)(plurality). See also State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 
415, 418 (Utah 1991)(recognizing privacy interest in bank records under Article I section 
14). 
The tripartite Fourth Amendment analysis of police-citizen encounters is 
succinctly set forth in United States v. Armijo, 781 F. Supp. 1551 (D. N.M. 1991), as 
follows: 
There are three different levels of police-citizen encounters, each 
requiring different degrees of Fourth Amendment scrutiny: consensual 
encounters, Terry stops, and arrests. Often the lines between these 
police-citizen encounters are blurred and in some instances,. . . can rapidly 
escalate through all three levels. 
The first, a consensual police-citizen encounter, is characterized by 
the voluntary cooperation of a citizen in response to non-coercive 
questioning. Since courts have found this to be a de minimis intrusion not 
amounting to a seizure, this type of encounter does not warrant Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny. "[A] seizure does not occur simply because a police 
officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions. So long as a 
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reasonable person would feel free fto disregard the police and go about his 
business,... the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is 
required." "Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of 
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we 
conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." Thus, "the crucial test is whether, 
taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the 
police conduct would have 'communicated to a reasonable person that he 
was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.'" 
If a reasonable person would not feel free to ignore the police 
presence, the encounter escalates into a Terry stop, characterized as a 
"brief, non-intrusive detention during a frisk for weapons or preliminary 
questioning. . . ." "It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs 
'seizures' of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house 
and prosecution for crime — 'arrests' in the traditional terminology. It must 
be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and 
restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person." 
Although this is considered a seizure of the person within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it need not be supported by probable 
cause. Rather, in order to justify an investigatoiy stop, the officer need have 
only "specific and articulable facts sufficient to give rise to reasonable 
suspicion that a person has committed or is committing a crime." 
"Anything less would invite intrusions upon the constitutionally guaranteed 
rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result 
this Court has consistently refused to sanction." 
Police may not, in the name of investigating a person who is no more 
than suspected of criminal activity, carry out a full search of the person, his 
automobile or other effects. Nor may the police detain an individual's 
luggage unless the officer can articulate specific facts sufficient to give rise 
to reasonable suspicion the traveler's luggage contains contraband. More 
importantly, the police may not seek to verify their suspicions by means 
approaching the conditions of arrest. The investigative methods employed 
should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel 
the officer's suspicion in a short period of time. 
If the intrusiveness of the investigation increases, the encounter 
escalates into an arrest which is characterized by highly intrusive or 
lengthy search or detention. An arrest is justified only when there is 
probable cause to believe a person has committed or is committing a crime. 
"Probable cause to arrest exists where facts and circumstances within the 
arresting officer's knowledge and of which they have reasonably 
trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of 
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reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed 
by the person to be arrested." 
Id. at 1555-56 (citations omitted). Accord. State v. Hansen. 2000 UT App 353 at ^  12, 17 
P.3dll35, 1139. 
Consistent with the foregoing constitutional law, Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 
defines the prerequisite and limits of an investigative detention, stating, 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
In the instant matter, the conduct of the police in taking Mallery and Rosillo out of 
the cab with at least one gun drawn, frisking them, cuffing them, telling Mallery 
incorrectly that he matched the description of a robber, and demanding to know what was 
in Mallery's pocket after Mallery had already identified himself (R. 272 at 34-46), 
constituted an arrest, requiring proof of probable cause. See, e.g.. Armijo; Hansen, 
supra. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15, supra. See also Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491, 
499 (1983)( "In the name of investigating a person who is not more than suspected of 
criminal activity, the police may not carry out a full search of the person or of his 
automobile or other effects. Nor may the police seek to verify their suspicions by means 
that approach the condition of an arrest."). 
Hamideh's conduct in demanding to know what was in Mallery's pocket went 
beyond the limits of a Terry frisk, and constituted an invasion of Mallery's legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the contents of his pocket, or in other words, a search, requiring 
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proof of both probable cause and exigent circumstances. See e ^ State v. Whittenback 
621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980)(officer's command that suspect empty his pockets 
constituted a search). See also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64-65 (1968)(search 
for evidence exceeds Terry pat-down); United States v. Santillanes. 848 F.2d 1103, 1109 
(10th Cir. 1988)(officer's search of contents of defendant's pockets exceeded proper 
Terry frisk).2 
At the time of the arrest, the police suspected that two Hispanic males had taken a 
cab from an apartment in the general vicinity of the crime, in an area and at a time when 
there were other citizens in the neighborhood (R. 272 at 5-6, 12, 15). They had no 
information that the cab suspects' clothing, height or weight matched the description of 
the robbers, and significantly, one of the passengers of the car was in fact Caucasian, not 
Hispanic. 
These circumstances established mere proximity to the crime, which does not give 
rise to reasonable suspicion, let alone probable cause. See State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 
(Utah App. 1987)(no reasonable suspicion existed to justify stop of men at 3:30 a.m. in 
high crime area, when one of them made furtive gesture to hide knapsack); State v. 
Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985)(no reasonable suspicion existed to justify stop of 
2
 Under Article I § 14 of the Utah Constitution, to justify a warrantless search, 
the police must establish both probable cause and exigent circumstances. See e^ g. State v. 
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah 1996). Exigent circumstances exist only when a 
reasonable person would believe that police actions are required to prevent harm to 
police, other people or evidence, or that some other event would occur to thwart police 
efforts. See e j . State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 18 (Utah App. 1993). 
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two men walking three blocks from burglary at 1:40 a.m., who were described in the area 
by another police officer two hours prior); State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 
19&6)(per curiam)(slow\y moving vehicle, with out of state plates, in neighborhood in 
which a number of burglaries had occurred, without more, is insufficient to support 
reasonable suspicion to justify detention of the occupants thereof). See also Sibron v. 
New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-63 (1968)(policeman did not have probable cause to arrest 
suspect observed approaching and interacting with several known drug addicts over a 
period of eight hours); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979)(police executing search 
warrant for tavern and bartender for drugs had no basis for Terry frisk of bar patron); 
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979)("In short, appellant's activity was no different 
from the activity of other pedestrians in that neighborhood. The fact that appellant was in 
a neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding 
that appellant himself was engaged in criminal conduct."). 
The trial court's analysis of the search and seizure issues was incorrect in many 
respects. As was explained above, the police did not have reasonable suspicion to justify 
a stop, let alone probable cause to justify the arrests. See, e.g., Trujillo, supra. 
Assuming that the initial stop was justified, once the police realized that Mallery 
was Caucasian and wearing a red cap, rather than Hispanic and wearing a dark cap as the 
robber supposedly was, they should have released the suspects. See, e.g.. City of St. 
George v. Carter, 945 P.2d 165, 169 (Utah App. 1997)(in course of detention, officer's 
actions must efficiently confirm or dispel suspicion, or scope of detention is violated). 
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The Terry frisk of Mr. Mallery was illegal because the police lacked reasonable 
suspicion to believe that Mr. Mallery, a Caucasian wearing a red cap, was the suspect that 
they were looking for, let alone that he was armed or that the safety of the officer or 
others was in danger. State v. White. 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993)(tcthere must be 
separately established reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior when the frisk takes 
place as well as a reasonable basis for believing there exists a danger to officers or others 
in the vicinity."); State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985)(police Terry frisk of burglary 
suspect upheld when person searched matched description, encounter occurred within 
thirty minutes of burglaiy within one block of crime, and police observed a large bulge in 
front pocket). 
The trial court erred in relying on the contents of Mallery's pocket in his probable 
cause analysis, because the search of Mallery's pocket was unlawful. See, e.g., 
Whittenback, supra. 
The trial court erred in ruling that the search of Mallery's pocket was consensual, 
because the circumstances of the arrest were so coercive, and because any consent given 
by Mallery was clearly the product of the preceding illegalities in the unlawful stop and 
arrest, frisk, and the search of his pocket which occurred when Hamideh demanded to 
know the contents of the pocket. See State v. Shoulderblade. 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 
1995)("[W]hen a consensual search is preceded by a Fourth Amendment violation, the 
evidence obtained from the search must be excluded unless the state proves the consent 
was voluntary and that it was not obtained by exploiting the violation."). As the court 
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explained in State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), "a defendant's consent to a 
search following illegal police activity is valid under the Fourth Amendment only if both 
of the following tests are met: (i) The consent was given voluntarily, and (ii) the consent 
was not obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality." Id. at 1262. The 
government bears the burden of proof. E.g., id. at 1263. 
In assessing voluntariness, the Court should consider all facts and circumstances, 
focusing on the nature of the police conduct and the personal characteristics of the 
accused. Id. at 1263. In assessing attenuation, the Court should consider "'the purpose 
and flagrancy of the official misconduct,' the 'temporal proximity' of the illegality and 
the consent, and 'the presence of intervening circumstances.'" Id. at 1263 (citation 
omitted). 
This Court can readily determine that the police conduct here, in pulling two men 
out of a cab at gunpoint, telling them they were considered armed and dangerous, and 
frisking and searching the men, who were surrounded by many officers and police cars, is 
coercive conduct. See id. The government presented no evidence that Mallery was a 
hardened criminal, or otherwise immune to the naturally coercive effects of such 
treatment by the police. Cf State v. Hansen. 2000 UT App 353 at 1f 24, 17 P.3d 1135, 
1144 ("Here, as in Robinette, the intrusive and suspicious questions asked by the officer, 
combined with the fact that the questions were asked immediately after the defendant was 
detained, indicate that a reasonable person would not have felt free go until they 
answered the additional questions. Furthermore, although the questions were not 
expressly coercive, the circumstances surrounding the request to search made the request 
subtly coercive. Specifically, Officer Huntington had only issued a warning regarding the 
lack of insurance and he had not taken any action regarding the improper left turn. 
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Therefore, a reasonable person would not have felt that their consent, if given, was a 
voluntary act of free will because Officer Huntington could have cited Hansen for the 
improper lane change if Hansen was uncooperative regarding the search."). 
Because the consent was not proved voluntary, this Court need analyze no further. 
See, e.g.. Thurman. 
However, the attenuation analysis confirms that suppression is in order. The 
police acted in intentional and flagrant disregard for the constitutional rights of the 
suspects in arresting them at gunpoint and searching them without probable cause. 
Mallery's purported consent was given in the midst of this police misconduct, and was 
not isolated from it by any intervening circumstances. In these circumstances, there was 
no lawful consent to justify the search of Mallery or Rosillo, and the trial court should 
have ordered all evidence stemming from the unlawful detention of Mallery suppressed. 
See Thurman, supra. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED 
THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION. 
In State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court 
determined that because of the highly unreliable nature of eyewitness identification 
testimony, and because of the tendency of jurors to be favorably impressed with such 
testimony, despite its weaknesses, under Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution, Utah trial 
courts must carefully screen eyewitness identifications for reliability. 
The relevant factors for courts to consider in assessing the reliability of eyewitness 
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identifications are set forth as follow: 
(1) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2) 
the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the 
witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and 
mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the 
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed and 
the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it 
correctly. 
Id. at 781 (quoting State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah 1986)). 
In Mallery's case, the trial court's ruling on the eyewitness identification was as 
follows: 
Finally, the Court ruled at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing 
that the initial show-up and identification of the defendant as one of the two 
that were involved in the robbery where Mr. Lund was the victim was 
proper. The Court determined that there was no inappropriate suggestion 
on the part of the police officers. The victim, Mr. Lund, not only made an 
immediate positive identification of the defendant and the co-defendant as 
being the persons who robbed him a few moments before at the Ute Car 
Wash on 300 East and 300 South, but has remained consistent in that 
identification through various court hearings and a line-up after the 
defendant's arrest. 
(R. 163). 
The trial court's analysis was obviously inadequate under Ramirez. He did not 
make any ultimate conclusion of reliability, and the only factor he discussed was factor 4, 
whether the identification was the product of suggestion and whether Lund had remained 
consistent in making the identification (R. 163). Cf. State v. Nelson. 950 P.2d 940, 942-
43 (Ut. App. 1997)(reversing trial court's denial of motion to suppress eyewitness 
identification because the trial court did not hear evidence, discuss the Ramirez reliability 
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factors or make a finding of reliability). 
Consideration of the first three Ramirez factors counsels against a finding of 
reliability. Lund testified that the robbery took a total of about ten to fifteen seconds (R. 
272 at 67). While he felt he got a good look at the robbers' faces and focused on them 
(R. 272 at 68), the fact that he described Mallery as Hispanic and wearing a dark cap in 
his description and then conceded in court that Mallery is Caucasian and was wearing a 
red cap demonstrates that he did not pay great attention to their appearance, or did not 
have great acuity, or was simply overcome by the stress of the situation. 
The factors addressed by the trial court were elucidated by the Ramirez court as 
follows: 
The fourth reliability factor is whether the witness's identification 
was made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter or whether it 
was a product of suggestion. Here, relevant circumstances include the 
length of time that passed between the witness's observation at the time of 
the event and the identification of defendant; the witness's mental capacity 
and state of mind at the time of the identification; the witness's exposure to 
opinions, descriptions, identifications, or other information from other 
sources; instances when the witness or other eyewitnesses to the event 
failed to identify defendant; instances when the witness or other 
eyewitnesses gave a description of the actor that is inconsistent with 
defendant; and the circumstances under which defendant was presented to 
the witness for identification. 
Id. at 783 (citations omitted). 
On both counts addressed, the trial court was clearly erroneous and legally 
incorrect. 
In finding that there was no inappropriate suggestion by the police, the trial court 
overlooked the facts that the suspects were cuffed and surrounded and spotlighted by the 
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police when the eyewitness arrived (R. 272 at 70-72). He failed to recognize that show-
ups such as occurred here are inherently suggestive. See, e.g., Ramirez, at 777 (show-up 
occurred when defendant was sole suspect, handcuffed to chainlink fence and surrounded 
by the police, as witnesses viewed him from back seat of police car) and at 784 
(indicating concern with blatant suggestiveness of showup). 
Of greater significance, he ignored the critical facts which distinguish this case 
from all others: before going to the show-up, Lund had been listening to Officer Hawk's 
radio, and knew that the police had arrested and searched the two suspects, who were 
found to be in possession of his identification and other property (R. 272 at 80). These 
trial court's finding that there was no suggestion involved in the showup simply cannot be 
reconciled with these facts. 
While Lund did consistently identify Mallery in the two police show-ups, at the 
line-up and in court, Lund was not consistent in his descriptions of Mallery, whom he 
originally incorrectly described as Hispanic and wearing a dark baseball cap (R. 272 at 
81). But see Ramirez, supra. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, his description 
changed, to add that one suspect was wearing a tan shirt, that both were wearing jeans, 
and that the gunman's cap was red (R. 272 at 66).3 
In relying on the "positive" nature of Lund's identification, the trial court erred 
further, because Ramirez specifically holds that an eyewitness's level of certainty is not a 
3
 He believed that he had included these facts in his original description until 
he listened to the dispatch tape of his description (R. 272 at 79). 
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proper factor, in light of empirical studies indicating that at times, the more certain an 
eyewitness is, the greater the likilihood is that the witness is incorrect. See Ramirez, 817 
P.2d at 781 (recognizing that empirical studies demonstrate that at times, the more certain 
an eyewitness is of the identification, the more likely the eyewitness is to be incorrect); 
and Ramirez at 781 (listing factors bearing on reliability and noting that eyewitness's 
level of certainty is not a relevant consideration in determining suppression of eyewitness 
identification under state constitutional analysis). 
Concededly, Utah appellate case law has granted trial courts broad discretion to 
admit eyewitness identifications despite the suggestiveness of show-ups. See e^ g. State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 784 (Utah 1991)(affirming admission of eyewitness identification 
testimony despite "troublesome" "blatant suggestiveness of the showup," which was 
compounded by the fact that no witness saw the assailant's complete face, on the grounds 
that the trial court had the discretion to resolve credibility issues and to assess demeanor 
evidence); State v. Hoffhine. 2001 UT 4 at U 7, 20 P.3d 265, 267 (officer took victim to 
scene of arrest and shone spotlights on two suspects, one at a time). 
However, this case goes beyond all others in the suggestiveness of the show-up, 
because prior to the show-up, the victim of the crime was listening to a police radio, and 
overheard not only the arrest of the two suspects, but also the fact that the suspects were 
found carrying his stolen property. Combined with the suggestive nature of the show-up, 
which occurred when the suspects were cuffed and surrounded by multiple police officers 
and cars, and spotlighted by the officer accompanying the victim, these facts preclude a 
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finding of reliability of the identification, which was necessarily the product of 
suggestion. 
The trial court's analysis was inadequate and legally incorrect under the governing 
law of Ramirez. 
CONCLUSION 
The State's case against Mallery consisted of evidence seized in violation of Mr. 
Malleiy's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, and of constitutionally 
unreliable eyewitness identification testimony. 
Because this evidence was inadmissible and so completely prejudicial to Mr. 
Mallery, this Court should reverse Mallery's conviction and the denials of his motions to 
suppress. 
DATED this ^ 1 day of December, 2001. 
Respectfully submitted: 
Richard P. Mauro 
Attorney for Mr. Mallery 
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I hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered/mailed, postage prepaid, a copy 
of the foregoing to Attorney General Mark Shurtleff, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114-0871, this Z V day of December, 2001. 
Richard P. Mauro 
Attorney for Mr. Williams 
Delivered/mailed accordingly this Z^f day of December, 2001. 
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CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/18/2001 {Guilty Plea} 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Baaed on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
o£ not less than six years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Pri son. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff; The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
PlaintiffiAppellee, : NOTICE OF APPEAL 
vs. : 
ANDREW MALLERY, : Case No. 001914668FS 
Defendant. : Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Andrew Mallery, Defendant/Appellant in the 
above-entitled action, hereby appeals to the Utah Supreme Court from the final judgement of 
conviction for Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, rendered against him on the 1st day of 
June, 2001 by the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DATED: June 25,2001. 
Richard P. Mauro 
Lawyer for Defendant/ Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Richard P. Mauro, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered a copy of the 
foregoing to the District Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and 
the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, 
P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this Cj Cday of June, 2001. 
DELIVERED this day of June, 2001. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 001914668 
vs. : 
ANDREW OWENS MALLERY, : 
Defendant. ; 
The above-referenced matter was before the Court on April 9, 
2001, at 9:00 a.m. Counsel for the State and the defendant were 
present, and the defendant was present. The Court took evidence 
regarding the matters raised in the defendant's Motion to Suppress 
Personal and Residential Search, as well as initial identification 
of the defendant. Following the taking of evidence, the Court 
heard closing arguments of counsel and ruled on a number of the 
issues raised in the defendant's Motion, and took certain portions 
of the Motion under advisement. The Court has reviewed the 
evidence, the arguments of counsel and the written submissions, and 
being fully advised, enters the following Minute Entry decision. 
The Court determined that the search of the residence at 228 
South 300 East was with permission of the occupant, and that there 
was no constitutional infirmity with regard to that search. During 
that search, the victim's wallet and a firearm that matched the 
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description of the firearm used in the armed robbery were located. 
The Court therefore denied the defendant's Motion to Suppress the 
evidence obtained during the search of the residence. 
The Court further determined that the search of the 
defendant's person, assuming the detention was otherwise 
appropriate, at the scene of the location where the police officers 
stopped the cab in which the defendant and co-defendant were 
riding, was with the defendant's consent. 
Further, the Court ruled that the initial stop of the cab in 
which the defendant and the co-defendant were riding was 
appropriate. The Court determined that the officers had at least 
an articulable suspicion regarding the occupants of the cab as 
being involved in the robbery which they were investigating. 
Finally, the Court ruled at the conclusion of the evidentiary 
hearing that the initial show-up and identification of the 
defendant as one of the two that were involved in the robbery where 
Mr. Lund was the victim was proper. The Court determined that 
there was no inappropriate suggestion on the part of the police 
officers. The victim, Mr. Lund, not only made an immediate 
positive identification of the defendant and the co-defendant as 
being the persons who robbed him a few moments before at the Ute 
Car Wash on 300 East and 300 South, but has remained consistent in 
that identification through various court hearings and a line-up 
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after the defendant's arrest. Accordingly, the defendant's Motion 
to Suppress the initial identification of him by the victim at the 
scene of the stop is denied. 
After considering the position of the parties, the Court is 
satisfied that the detention and the manner of detention, including 
the length of detention of the defendant after the initial stop, 
was proper. The Court determines that not only did the officers 
have a reasonable, articulable suspicion to make the initial stop, 
but after the defendant was out of the cab, the police not only had 
a continued articulable suspicion, but had additional facts to 
constitute probable cause so as to believe that the defendant was 
involved in the robbery at the Ute Car Wash a few minutes before. 
The defendant Mallery was found wearing a baseball cap as was 
reported to the police officers. The defendant matched the build 
and height given as identification of the perpetrators of the 
robbery, and the defendant came from the immediate area of the 
robbery in the cab just a few minutes after the robbery occurred. 
The age of both the defendant and the co-defendant Rosillo matched 
the description given by the victim, Mr. Lund. In addition to all 
the foregoing that created probable cause for the officers to 
believe that the defendant had been involved in a robbery a few 
minutes before at the Ute Car Wash, there was additional 
information after the defendant voluntarily agreed to have his 
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person searched by the police officer, where identification and 
other documents relating to the victim, Mr. Lund, were located. 
Those documents found in the voluntary search of the defendant's 
person serve to increase the quantity of information available to 
the police officers to create additional probable cause regarding 
the defendant Mallery. 
The nature of the detention was reasonable to effect the 
purpose of the stop and, taking into account the nature of the 
crime being investigated, the manner of the detention was 
appropriate as well. The officers detained the defendant and co-
suspect, Rosillo, near the location of the stop to see if they 
could be identified by the victim, and such a procedure is proper. 
The victim was close and the detention would be of short duration. 
The fact that the defendant was handcuffed while being detained by 
the police officers, while not usually called for, is appropriate 
under the circumstances where a crime being investigated was a 
crime involving the use of a firearm. 
Accordingly, the defendants complaint that he was improperly 
detained after the initial stop in an unreasonable manner for an 
unreasonable length of time, so as to void the initial 
identification or void the voluntary search of the defendants 
person, are without substance and as previously indicated, denied. 
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The Court will expect counsel for the State to prepare 
detailed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and an Order 
denying the defendant's Motion addressed/not only at the conclusion 
of the evidentiary hearing on April 9/2001, but also as set forth 
in this Minute Entry decision. 
Dated this f^> day of April/2001. 
/TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
/DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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